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After proceedings at national level during eight years, and after a preliminary ruling by the EU 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg on 16 December 2008 (Case C-3/07), the European Court of 
Human Rights (Fourth section) in Strasbourg has delivered a controversial judgment in the 
domain of protection of personal data and data journalism. The Court comes to the conclusion 
that a prohibition issued by the Finnish Data Protection Board that prohibited two media 
companies (further: Satamedia) from publishing personal data in the manner and to the extent 
they had published these data before, is to be considered as a legal, legitimate and necessary 
interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and information.  
The European Court agrees with the Finnish authorities that the applicants could not rely on the 
exception of journalistic activities within the law of protection of personal data. In finding no 
violation of the right to freedom of expression and information, the Court not only accepts a 
restrictive interpretation of the notion of journalistic activity, it also reduces drastically the impact 
of the right to information of public interest. 
The judgment 
The Court considers that the prohibition issued by the Data Protection Board did not prevent the 
applicant companies from publishing taxation data as such. However, it prohibited them from 
collecting, saving and processing such data to a large extent, with the result that an essential 
part of the information previously published in Veropörssi magazine and via an SMS-service for 
taxation data, could no longer be continued. Therefore the Court had to examine whether the 
interference with the applicant companies’ right to impart information complied with Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
The Court starts by referring to its recently developed set of principles to be applied when 
examining the necessity of an instance of interference with the right to freedom of expression in 
the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”. It noted that in such cases 
the Court may be required to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when 
protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each 
other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article 10 
and, on the other, the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8. These criteria are:  
(see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], §§ 109-113  and Axel Springer AG v. Germany 
[GC], §§ 89-95) 
“(i)  contribution to a debate of general interest; 
  
 (ii)  how well-known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report; 
 (iii)  prior conduct of the person concerned; 
 (iv)  method of obtaining the information and its veracity/circumstances in which the  
             photographs were taken; 
 (v)  content, form and consequences of the publication; and 
 (vi)  severity of the sanction imposed”. 
 
The European Court recognizes that a general subject-matter was at the heart of the publication 
in question, namely the taxation data about natural persons’ taxable income and assets, while 
such data are a matter of public record in Finland, available to everyone. The Court agrees 
explicitly that as such this taxation information was a matter of public interest. And the Court 
notes that “from the point of view of the general public’s right to receive information about 
matters of public interest, and thus from the standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds 
for imparting such information to the public” (§ 65). The Court is aware that taxation data of 
individual persons are public in Finland, in accordance to the Act on the Public Disclosure and 
Confidentiality of Information, and it emphasizes that there was no suggestion that Satamedia 
had obtained the taxation data by subterfuge or other illicit means. The Court equally observes 
that the accuracy of the published information was not in dispute. The Court also refers to the 
preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU of 16 December 2008, that found that the 
activities of Satamedia related to data from documents which were in the public domain under 
Finnish legislation, could be classified as “journalistic activities”, if their object was to disclose to 
the public information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which was used to transmit 
it. 
However, the problematic issue was the extent of the published information by Satamedia, as 
the Veropörssi magazine had published in 2002 taxation data on 1.2 million persons. According 
to the domestic authorities the publishing of taxation information to such an extent could not be 
considered as journalism, but as processing of personal data which Satamedia had no right to 
do. Leaving a broad margin of appreciation, the European Court of Human Rights accepts the 
finding by the Finnish authorities that the publication of personal data by Satamedia could not 
be regarded as journalistic activity, in particular because that derogation for journalistic purpose 
in the Personal Data Act (see also Article 9 of Protection of Personal Data Directive 95/46/EC of 
24 October 1995) was to be interpreted strictly. The Court refers to the finding by the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court “that the publication of the whole database collected for 
journalistic purposes could not be regarded as journalistic activity” and that the public interest 
did not require such publication of personal data to the extent that had been seen in the present 
case (§ 70). 
The European Court is of the opinion that the Finnish judicial authorities have attached sufficient 
importance to Satamedia’s right to freedom of expression, while also taking into consideration 
the right to respect for private life of those tax-payers whose taxation information had been 
published. The fact that the prohibition issue by the Finnish authorities culminated to the 
discontinuation of Veropörssi magazine and Satamedia’s SMS-service was, according to the 
Court, not a direct consequence of the interference by the Finnish authorities, but an economic 
decision made by Satamedia itself. Furthermore the prohibition was not a criminal sanction, but 
  
an administrative one and thereby of a less severe character. Having regard to all the foregoing 
factors, and taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, the 
Court considers that the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests 
at stake. Therefore, with a 6/1 majority, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 
10 of the Convention 
The Court also rejects Satamedia’s claim that Article 14 of the Convention was violated. 
Satamedia had argued that they had been discriminated against vis-à-vis other newspapers 
which had been able to continue publishing the taxation information in question. According to 
the European Court Satamedia could not be compared with other newspapers publishing 
taxation data as the quantity published by them was clearly greater than elsewhere. Therefore 
Satamedia’s situation was not sufficiently similar to the situation of other newspapers, and 
hence there was no discrimination in the terms of Article 14. The Court finds this part of the 
application manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. 
Dissent and comment 
In her dissenting opinion in annex to the judgment, judge Tsotsoria emphasizes that the 
majorities’ approach does not follow the established case-law of the Court finding a violation of 
Article 10 in cases where national authorities have taken measures to protect publicly available 
and known information on matters of public interest from disclosure. It states further that 
“regrettably, the majority agreed with the respondent state that the applicant companies’ 
activities did not fall within the exception for the purposes of journalism in the Personal Data 
Act” and that this can lead to an interpretation “that journalists are so limited in processing data 
that the entire journalistic activity becomes futile (..), particularly in the light of the dynamic and 
evolving character of media”. 
The outcome of what is known in Europe as the Satamedia case raises most fundamentally the 
question: “What is the problem of publishing in the media data which have originally been 
disclosed by the authorities and are publicly accessible to everyone?”. What is the “pressing 
social need” behind the prohibition of data from public record that are subject of public interest 
in Finland? There is no indication that the publication of these data caused harm or damage to 
individual persons or to society. The open policy on taxation in Finland is precisely a good 
example of transparency on matters of public interest. In such a context it is difficult to 
understand that the journalistic activity of Satamedia and the publication of data of public 
interest needed to be curtailed in order only to make a strict application of the law on the 
protection of personal data, nota bene with regard to data that were already in the public 
domain. One could assume that a ‘fair balance’ should rather lead to another outcome, as in 
earlier cases the European Court found that interferences with editors’ or journalists’ rights for 
making confidential or secret information public, could not be justified as being necessary in a 
democratic society, referring to the task of media to report on matters of public interest, in 
accordance with the principles of responsible journalism or professional ethics. In other cases 
the Court found that there were no legitimate reasons for interfering with the publication of 
information that was already in the public domain (see e.g. Observer and Guardian v. UK, Bluf! 
t. the Netherlands and Fressoz and Roire v. France). Furthermore, it is unclear for what reasons 
  
a more limited publication of the taxation data in other media is acceptable under the exception 
of journalistic activity, and why precisely, from what extent onwards or under what type or form 
of journalistic presentation, the publication of the taxation data becomes illegal. 
 
One of the first comments analyzing the Satamedia-judgment by the ECtHR pointed out that 
“the ruling in this case seems absurd since what the applicants were doing was to make the 
data more reader-friendly. The ECtHR has not really clarified what the proper way of using 
some publicly available data is. The only guideline given is whether the alleged activity was 
conducted for public interest. For instance, if a magazine made an analysis with the data, the 
article can be of public interest because people can look at demographic patterns or even 
assess the current taxation policy. Does it mean that publishing the data with some analysis 
would attract the derogation to apply? If that is the case, how much analysis will be needed? 
Therefore, it is really hard to draw a line here to determine whether certain publication can be 
recognized by the law as journalistic activity”.  
The judgment of the Fourth section of the European Court is not final yet. A request for a 
referral to the Grand Chamber in application of Article 43 may be considered by the applicants, 
also taking into account the serious impact the judgment may have on interpreting notions of 
journalistic activity and public interest in the context of guaranteeing the right to freedom of 
expression in the world of data journalism, digital media and journalistic (big) data processing. 
 
For the full record: the Court in this case found a violation of Article 6 § 1 (fair trial) of the 
Convention, as the length of the proceedings at domestic level (six years and six months) was 
excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement, even taking into account the 
complexity of the case. 
